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Abstract
In 2000 the Argentine  antitrust authorities conducted  a  authorities exercised its advocacy  role in a country that
study of the state of competition  in the gasoline  market.  underwent an extensive process of deregulation  and
The study concludes  with a set of policy  privatization.  Serebrisky  assesses the design and impact
recommendations  (that is,  limits to vertical integration  of the policies recommended  by the Argentine antitrust
and to the duration of contracts between oil  companies  authorities.  In particular,  he evaluates under which
and gasoline  stations)  which were subsequently  circumstances  the new policies can reduce barriers to
implemented  by the Argentine government.  This was one  entry and foster competition in the Argentine gasoline
of the rare occasions where  the Argentine antitrust  market.
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Toma's Serebriskyl
After decades of imposing several  types of regulations,  the Argentine  government
deregulated  the  gasoline  market  in  1991.  Once  the  restructuring  and  privatization  of
Yacimientos  Petroliferos  Fiscales  (YPF) -the  formerly  state-owned  petroleum  company
and the  largest firm  in  Argentina-  was  completed  in  1993,  the  law established  that  the
government  should  reduce  its role  exclusively  to the  enforcement  of industry-specific
environmental  laws.  Since  1997,  following a sharp decline in crude oil prices, there  have
been  complaints  that  the  deregulation  of  the  Argentine  gasoline  market  was  not
successful  because  the level  of gasoline prices -net of taxes- is too high and they  do not
adjust to changes in crude oil prices, especially when crude oil prices fall. As an example,
from January  1997 to October  1998,  the crude oil price  fell 55.4%  while the  net price of
premium gasoline fell only 7.4%. For the same change in crude oil prices, the net price of
premium gasoline in the United States fell  19.8%2.
' World Bank Institute, tserebriskvyworldbank.org.  The findings,  interpretations  and conclusions
expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author.  I would like to thank Antonio Estache, Lucas
Grosman, Diego Margot, Pablo Mercuri  and Pablo Presso  for their comments and suggestions.
2  Mercuri  (2001) presents  a detailed study of price asymmetries in the Argentine gasoline market,  and
Serebrisky (2000) shows the evolution of prices in Argentina and the United  States.The  behavior  of  prices  in  the  Argentine  gasoline  market  motivated  academic
research  aimed  at  determining  the  intensity  of  competition  in  this  market.  The
conclusions  of the  papers  written  about  this  topic  are  contradictory.  Aspiazu  (1995)
argues that the observed differences  in levels and  adjustment patterns  of gasoline  prices
between Argentina and the United States (which is used as a benchmark  for a competitive
market)  is  a consequence  of an  oligopoly  operating  under  collusion.  On  the  contrary,
FEEL (1999) and Coloma (1997) do not find any evidence of the existence  of an implicit
agreement.  Serebrisky  (2000)  presents  different  econometric  tests  to  evaluate  the
hypothesis  of tacit collusion, finding no conclusive evidence of this type of behavior.  But
he  agrees  with a  study the  Argentine  Antitnist Commission  did in  1998  and concludes
saying  that  "after  almost  a decade  of  deregulation,  price  competition  in  the  gasoline
market is less intense than what the Argentine government expected to be".
In  2000,  the  newly  created  Secretariat  of Consumer  Affairs  and  Defense  of
Competition  (SDCyC),  elaborated  a report3 of the gasoline  market which recommended
the  adoption  of specific  policies  to  increase  the  competition  in  this  market.  The  most
important policy  recommendations  were:  (a) limit the duration  of contracts between  oil
companies and dealers that operate gasoline stations and (b) establish a ceiling to vertical
integration,  measured  in  a  percentage  of the  network  of gasoline  stations  that  an  oil
company can own and operate.
The Argentine  president,  following  this report,  issued a decree  that implemented
new policies in the gasoline  market. This decree is one of the few examples of successful
advocacy  achieved  by  the  Argentine  SDCyC.  In  Latin  American  countries  it  is  not
common  for competition  agencies  to act on  their own initiative and  ask governments  to
adopt  pro-competitive policies.  In  general,  they limit their role  to merger requests  or to
solve  accusations  of anticompetitive  conducts.  However as explained  in a recent  survey
(International  Competition  Network,  2002),  competition  agencies  are  increasing  their
advocacy  role  to  promote  market  structures  more  supportive  of intense  competition.
Advocacy  allows a competition  agency to expand its reach and play an important role  in
areas  where  its role  is usually  ignored.  In  particular,  advocacy  can  give  a competition
3 httD://www.minproduccion.gov.ar/secdef/basehome/merCadodecombustibles.pdf
2agency  a  word  in  the  design  of  restructuring  of  industries  before  privatization  or
deregulation, in the concession or licensing processes and in the way access rules are set.
In Argentina,  the competition  agency  could  not prove  that oil firms  engaged in
any anticompetitive  conduct.  Therefore, it could  not use the instruments the antitrust law
has  -sale  of assets,  open  access  to  essential  facilities-  to modify  behavior  and  market
structure.  However,  the  fact that oil  firms were  not colluding or did not engage  in any
other  type  of  anticompetitive  conduct  did  not  bar  the  antitrust  authority  to  use  its
advocacy  power  by  evaluating  the  state  of competition  in  the  market  and  asking  the
government to adopt policies to stimulate more competition.
In this paper we present  the evidence  that supported  the policy  recommendations
and critically  assess their foundation  and the impact they have had in the  oil industry.  In
particular  we  evaluate  the  ability  of the  policies  adopted  in  Argentina  to  modify  the
market structure and incentive a more aggressive price competition.
This paper- is organized  as follows.  Section  1 presents  the state of the Argentine
gasoline market before and after its deregulation4. Section 2 explains the relation between
gasoline prices,  import parity  and competition.  Section  3  elaborates  on the consequence
that  YPF's  privatization  model  had  on  the  intensity  of competition  in  the  Argentine
gasoline  market  and  Section  4  emphasizes  the impact  that  the absence  of independent
refineries  and a developed  wholesale  market have  on the intensity  of competition in  the
Argentine gasoline market.  Sections  5 describes how the SDCyC identified the exclusive
contracts between  oil companies  and  gasoline  stations  as  a  significant  barrier  to entry.
Section  6  and  7  describe  and  evaluate  the  policy  recommendations.  Finally,  section  8
concludes.
1. The Argentine Gasoline Market
Until  1991, the  evolution  of the Argentine  gasoline  market was characterized  by
the  belief  that  petroleum  was  a  strategic  resource.  This  belief  justified  a  significant
government  intervention  that was direct, through the control of the largest firm in the oil
4 This paper does not explain the effects that the major devaluation of the Argentine peso in 2002 had on
the gasoline  market (i.e. quantity demanded,  changes in sector taxes, subsidies  implemented  by the national
government).
3industry -YPF-  and indirect via the regulatory  framework.  Before  its privatization,  YPF
controlled 63% of the refining capacity,  while Esso and Shell, the other two large firms in
the market,  accounted for a combined  32% of the total refining capacity. The government
determined  domestic  oil prices,  wholesale  and retail  gasoline  prices,  retail margins  and
taxes.
The  law guaranteed  that regulated  prices  should allow  firms to cover production
costs and obtain a reasonable return.  But in reality, the government did not apply this law.
Given that gasoline is an important determinant  of the price index, whenever  there was a
new  stabilization  plan,  gasoline  prices  were  used  as  an  "anchor".  The  consequent
reduction in margins forced oil firms to be permanently involved in negotiations with the
sector authorities.
Not only the domestic commercialization  was regulated.  Imports of crude oil and
gasoline  were authorized  only when there was  a shortage  in domestic  production.  There
were  almost  no  exports  of  crude  oil  or  refined  products  during  the  period  prior  to
deregulation due to inefficiencies  in exploration, extraction and refining of crude oil.
The government decided where gasoline stations should be located.  A license was
provided  to  the  refinery  and  not  to  the  owner  of a  gasoline  station,  implying  that  a
gasoline station had to buy gasoline exclusively from the refinery that owned the license.
To avoid hold up problems,  gasoline station's  margins were also regulated.  The criterion
by which  new gasoline  stations  were allowed  to open was not clear but one of the rules
closely followed was that they should not compete  among themselves.  The condition  of
local monopolies  and regulated  prices gave no incentives  to provide  adequate services to
the  consumer.  Moreover,  the  inefficient  government  controls  induced  retail  outlet
operators to cheat adulterating gasoline.
In  January of  1991  the  Argentine  gasoline  market was  deregulated.  Restrictions
on prices, refining capacity,  location and  quantity of retail outlets were eliminated.  YPF
was privatized  in  1993, but a new management  began a radical  transformation process in
1991  aimed  at increasing productivity.  Labor productivity increased significantly  as total
personnel  decreased  from  fifty two thousand in  1990  to six thousand in  1994 while  total
sales increased from 3.5 to 4.4 billion dollars during the same period.
4A comprehensive  analysis of competition  in gasoline markets has to consider the
state  of  competition  in  each  of  the  production  and  commercialization  stages,  from
extraction  of crude oil  to retail distribution of gasoline.  In Argentina,  there is consensus
(Montamat  et al.  1999)  that the upstream segment of the market  (exploration,  extraction
and  commercialization  of crude  oil)  is competitive.  The deregulation  of the  oil market
and  the  privatization  of  YPF  allowed  Argentina  to  become  an  exporter  of crude  oil,
although  it  has  a  very  small  share  of  the  world  trade.  Refining  firms  that  are  not
integrated  backwards  (do  not  extract  oil)  can  buy  crude  oil  from  more  than  ten
international  firms that extract  oil  in Argentina.  Due to the  nonexistence of legal  (tariffs
or quotas) or logistic (for instance,  storage  facilities) barriers  to trade, refining firms can
buy crude oil from  suppliers  in other regions  of the  world. The  existence of freedom to
trade  implies  that  domestic  oil producers  can  not  extract any  economic  rent  . In  other
words, given that  crude oil producers  can not exercise  market power,  we  can  argue that
this market is competitive.
Seeing that there  are no competition concerns  in the upstream stage of the market,
the study of the state of competition  has to focus  in the downstream  stage of the market,
that is, the refining, wholesale and retail distribution of gasoline.
In  Argentina,  four  firms  account  for  more  than  85%  of  the  gasoline  market.
RepsolYPF6 is  the  largest  of them,  and  in  1999  the  Spanish  firm  Repsol  bought  the
majority  stake.  This firm  is  present  in  all  regions  of Argentina.  It has  the  two  largest
refineries  and co-owns  with Perez  Companc,  a domestic  firm7,  the only  refinery  in  the
north,  adding up to more  than 50% of the refining capacity  in  the country.  Esso (owned
by Exxon) and  Shell have been  in Argentina  for more than  fifty years  and each of them
has only one refinery,  which are located close to Buenos Aires.  Their combined  share of
the  refining  capacity  is  32%.  EG3  is  the  result  of  a merger,  in  1995,  of  three  small
domestic  oil firms.  This  firm,  that was  acquired by Repsol  in  1996  and later -in  2000-
5 In fact, domestic oil producers can sell in Argentina at a price slightly inferior to the import parity.  Thus,
we can argue that transportation  costs are a source of economic rent derived by location.
6 In this paper, the names YPF and RepsolYPF are used indistinctively.  After Repsol bought YPF these
companies merged  and adopted RepsolYPF as the new company's  name.
7 Petrobras made an offer to buy Perez Companc.  This merger is pending the approval of the Argentine
Antitrust Agency.
5sold to Petrobras,  the Brazilian state-owned oil firm has only one relatively  small refinery
(5%  of total refining capacity in Argentina) 600km south of Buenos Aires.
Figure  1 presents  the  evolution  of market  shares  for premium8 gasoline of the
largest four firms and  a category  "other"  that aggregates  both small  branded  firms  (Sol
Petr6leo, Refinor, Rhasa)  and unbranded retail outlets. It is important to highlight that the
SDCyC policy recommendations  were made in 2000. Up to that year9 market shares were
remarkably  stable,  with the only exception  of the "other" firms that doubled  their market
share  from  5  to  10%.  The  growth  in  market  shares  of  the  latter  group  has  been
accompanied  by  an impressive  growth  in retail  outlets.  Table  1 shows  the evolution  of
retail  gasoline  outlets  in Argentina.  The  biggest change in the quantity  of retail  outlets
since deregulation is the fall in the quantity operating under the RepsolYPF flag, matched
by an almost equivalent increase in the quantity of unbranded outlets. Looking at figure  1
and table  1, it should come as a surprise the increase  in RepsolYPF's market share during
2002  and  the parallel  fall in  the market  share  of "others".  As  we explain  in  the  Policy
evaluation  section  this change was caused by the devaluation  of the Argentine currency
that has made the new policies adopted for this market very difficult to evaluate.
8  The Secretariat of Energy established  that  premium gasoline has to have more than 93 RON while
regular gasoline can have between 83 and 93 RON. In Argentina the ratio of premium to regular gasoline
consumption  is more than 2.
9 1995 is the first year with reliable information.  From 1991  to  1994 there are no comprehensive  price and
quantity time series data.
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TABLE  1: Evolution of retail outlets
1990  %Total  1994  %Total  1998  %Total  2001  %Total
RepsolYpf  2909  54.78  2753  51.70  2537  40.49  1955  31.08
Esso  947  17.83  1003  18.84  976  15.58  1145  18.20
Shell  952  17.93  933  17.52  1068  17.04  849  13.50
Eg3  502  9.45  565  10.61  622  9.93  668  10.62
Sol  0  0  23  0.43  146  2.33  254  4.04
Rhasa  0  0  N.D  N.D  54  0.86  146  2.32
Refinor  0  0  N.D  N.D  42  0.67  57  0.91
San Lorenzo  0  0  N.D  N.D  46  0.73  62  0.99
Unbranded  0  0  48  0.90  775  12.37  1155  18.36
TOTAL  5310  5325  6266  6291
Source:  Secretariat of Energy,  Argentina
ND: No data available
72. The evolution  of prices and their relation with the import parity
In the preceding paragraphs we described the evolution of market shares and retail
outlets.  In  general,  most  of the complaints  about competition  in  the Argentine  gasoline
market rely on the evolution of prices. It is apparent from figure 2 that gasoline prices  in
Argentina have a very different  adjustment pattern  to changes in crude oil prices than  in
the United States.
Figure 2
Gasoline Prices.  Net of taxes.  US and Argentina
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In the United States  fluctuations  in crude oil pricesl'  are reflected -with a lag- in
gasoline prices.  Besides, prices of all types of gasoline, -diesel, regular (not shown in the
figure)  and  premium-  tend  to move in the  same  direction.  This price  setting  process  is
strikingly different in Argentina where diesel, premium and regular gasoline prices do not
move in a parallel  way.  In Argentina, it is evident  from figure  2  that gasoline  prices do
not closely respond to changes in crude  oil prices.  It is remarkable  the stability of diesel
prices  from  1995  to  2000,  a period  characterized  by significant  upward  and  downward
'° The West Texas Intermediate is considered  in this paper as the international  price of crude oil.
8fluctuations in crude oil prices, that reached  more than 40%1  . A market where prices do
not react to changes  in its most important cost variable can not be defined as competitive.
An appropriate  proxy to study the intensity of competition  in a gasoline market  is
the relation between  gasoline prices  and the import parity (the cost of imported gasoline
ready  to be  sold in  the  domestic  market,  including  the  import price,  transportation  and
finance  costs).  In a homogeneous  good competitive  market,  assuming there is no barrier
to  entry,  if we  calculate  the  variable  "Price  minus Import  Parity"  the  result  should  be
zero.  In this  case,  domestic  firms  will not be  able to increase  the price because imports
will  enter the  domestic  market  as  soon  as the  domestic price  is  higher than  the cost  of
importing  the product.  However,  if the  good  is differentiated  (for instance  by brand  or
location)  the  variable  ""Price  minus Import  Parity"  would be  strictly  positive.  If it is
calculated  for  a  period  of  time,  it  should  be  positive  and  constant  unless  the
differentiation  component changes over time.
I  It  is  important  to  highlight  that during  this  period,  crude  oil  was  the  most  important  component  of
gasoline  production  costs.  It accounted  for  about 35%  of the retail price  of gasoline  in the  United  States
(EIA, 2001).
9Figure 3
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In  Argentina,  from  1994 to 2001,  the variable  "Price  minus Import  Parity"  was
positive  for  prernium,  regular  and  diesel  gasoline'2. oil  companies  argued  that  the
difference  between  the  domestic  price  and the  import  parity  was  a  consequence  of  a
"brand  premium"  that  the  Argentine  consumer  was  willing  to  pay.  Moreover,  the
existence  of a  brand  premium  is  consistent  with the  existence  of a  competitive  market
(Argentine  Chamber of Oil Industry, 2000). This argumnent could be valid if the behavior
of the variable "Price  - Import Parity"  is  constant  over time or if  it  changes  from time to
time  as  new  products  are  introduced  or the  average  consumer  changes  her  perception
about  the quality  of  a  brand.  From  figure  3  it  is  unmistakable  that the  oil companies'
argument is not consistent with the data; the series "Price minus Import Parity" have huge
fluctuations, explained by the rigidity of domestic prices relative to the movements in the
price of crude oil' 3. Sumnmarizing,  the evidence  suggests that oil companies  in  Argentina
are not price takers and they seem to be isolated from changes  in  gasoline prices in  other
32 Except for two months for diesel and one month for regular gasoline.  Gasoline prices are the average for
the whole country and were provided  by the Secretariat of Energy.
13 Changes in crude oil prices are fully reflected  in the import parity.regions,  implying  that imports  are  not  able  to effectively  discipline  Argentine  gasoline
prices.
To further analyze  the intensity of competition  in  the Argentine  gasoline  market
we must consider inter-brand  price competition.  The distribution  of prices  among brands
is  wider  for premium  gasoline  (figures  4  and  5).  The  uniformity  of diesel  prices  is  a
consequence of a more price-sensitive  consumer,  a higher volume of imports and a more
developed  wholesale  market.  Until  2002,  when  the  peso  suffered  a  significant
devaluation  that led to increases in gasoline  prices, the ranking of prices had been hardly
altered, another symptom of a market not characterized by intense price competition.
Figure 4
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3. Privatization model and its impact on competition.
Governments  have  a  wide  variety  of  objectives  when  they  embark  in  a
privatization  process.  Reduction  in  fiscal  deficits,  benefits  to  users,  improvements  in
infrastructure  quality  and capacity  and a market  structure  that promotes  competition  are
the most cited objectives (Estache, 2000).  In the case of YPF, it could be argued that the
government  pursued  fiscal  as  well  as  efficiency  objectives.  The  privatization  of YPF
brought  about a radical  change to the Argentine  oil sector.  Before its privatization,  YPF
systematically  lost money,  needing  transfers  by the national  government  to continue its
operations.  Its privatization  increased productivity  and significantly  improved efficiency
in the exploration and extraction of crude oil, derivative products and natural gas.
However  it  is  by  no  means  clear  that the  government,  when  deciding  how  to
privatize  YPF, incorporated  as a relevant  concern  the prospects  of a competitive  market
structure.  Or, on  the contrary,  it could be  said that the government  deliberately  ignored
the possibility of modifying the ex-ante market structure (before privatization)  to promote
a more competitive environment after the privatization.
12There  are two  main reasons  that justify  the  adoption  of the privatization  model
followed  by  the  Argentine  government.  First,  the  need  to  obtain  fiscal  resources.  By
selling  a  firm  with  a  significant  market  share  in  a  highly  concentrated  market,  with
control of key  access infrastructure  (ports,  pipelines),  the  price that can be obtained in a
public auction  is much higher than the price that results from selling a much smaller firm
that faces  the  prospects  of a very competitive  market.  Second,  in  order to gain political
support  for  the  privatization,  the  government  decided  to  privatize  YPF  following  a
"national champion" firm model  with significant presence in the market, imposing limits
to the percentage  of stocks each private economic  group could hold and keeping a golden
share  stock  -that  provided  the  government  with  veto  power  over  strategic  business
decisions. In this way, YPF would keep being a "national pride".
As  in  all  complex  privatization  processes,  the  actual  objectives  are  extremely
difficult  to  identify.  However,  after  six  years  of the  privatization,  and  despite  facing
complaints  about  the  intensity  of competition  in  the  gasoline  market,  the  Argentine
government  decided  to  trade  off its  stake  and  golden  share  in  YPF  for  fresh  fiscal
resources  offered by Repsol. The govemment could have taken this opportunity  to force
YPF to sell  some key assets  and  Jay  down  the conditions  to foster a more competitive
gasoline market; instead, it preferred more fiscal resources.
As a general  rule,  governments  should  take  advantage  of the  opportunity  that  a
privatization  or deregulation process provides to make structural changes in the industry,
shaping  a  more  competitive  market  structure.  If  they  miss  this  opportunity,  imposing
structural  remedies  through the use of competition laws is extremely more difficult.  The
policy recommendations  advocated  by the SDCyC for the gasoline market were aimed at
reducing strategic barriers to entry,  hoping that more effective competition would prevail
by  new  entry.  Reshaping  market  structure  by  forcing  disinvestments  of  key  assets,
although a desirable objective for the SDCyC, was an objective impossible to reach given
the respect  of firns'  property rights.  The only way that the Argentine  Antitrust  Agency
can  force  the disinvestments  of assets is by proving  that firms in  the market  (one, or  a
combination  of them)  implemented  anticompetitive  conducts.  Although  the  Argentine
Antitrust Commission  analyzed many filings for anticompetitive  conducts  in the gasoline
13market  up to the moment the  SDCyC released  its policy recommendations,  it could not
prove that oil firms engaged in any anticompetitive conduct.
4. Independent refineries and wholesale  market: market characteristics that make
price competition  more intense.
In  Argentina,  there  are  seven  refineries'4 that  produce  more  than  90%  of the
gasoline  consumed  in  the  country.  All  of these  refineries  were  constructed  before  the
deregulation  and are owned by the incumbent  oil firms.  Given the size of the Argentine
gasoline market,  the capacity  utilization rate (never exceeding 80%15)  and the significant
sunk costs (Scherer,  1996) involved in the construction of refineries,  no new refinery  was
expected  to be built  for  some  years  after deregulation.  In  fact,  more  than  eleven  years
after deregulation  no new refinery was built,  although  oil firms invested  to upgrade  the
quality and production capacity of existing refineries.
When  privatizing  YPF,  the  Argentine  government  had  the  opportunity  to  sell  a
refinery with significant capacity  (La Plata or Lujan de Cuyo) to an independent  refinery
(unbranded)  or to a new entrant. What would have been the consequences  of this option?.
On  the  one  hand,  as  mentioned  in  the  previous  section,  it  would  have  reduced  the
revenues  obtained  from  the privatization  of YPF  and  weakened  its  position  as  market
leader.  On the other hand, it would have reshaped  the competitive  scenario in the gasoline
market.  An  unbranded  refinery  could  have  sustained  the  development  of  a  wholesale
gasoline  market and the parallel emergence  of jobbers, that is, wholesale agents that play
a  key  role  in  competitive  gasoline  markets  (Borenstein,  1996,  1997).  The  main  role
jobbers  have  in  the  American  gasoline  market  -usually  used  as  a  benchmark  for  a
competitive  market-  is  to  arbitrage  between  unbranded  and  branded  refineries  when
feeding  unbranded  gasoline  stations.  The  absence  of jobbers  or  a  well  developed
wholesale  market has made the unbranded  gasoline stations  in Argentina too dependent
on  imports  and  on  the  willingness  of  the  incumbent  refining  oil  firms  to  sell  them
gasoline.
14 Lujan de Cuyo (RepsolYPF), La Plata (RepsolYPF), Dock Sud (Shell),  Campana (Esso), Bahfa Blanca
(EG3), Refinor (RepsolYPF,  Pluspetrol and  Perez Companc) and San Lorenzo  (Perez Companc).
5  For sector specific statistics  see http://energia.mecon.gov.ar/
14The alternative of selling a refinery to a new entrant, preferably  to a well-known
oil company,  would not have helped the development of a wholesale market. But it would
have undoubtedly  introduced more competition.  A new entrant, with a well-known brand,
and  a smaller  YPF,  would  have  left  a market  structure  with  four  firms having  similar
market  shares  (around  20-25%)  and a smaller  one -the three firms that in  1995  merged
and formed EG3- with  10% of the market. This scenario  is completely  different from the
one  currently prevailing,  where RepsolYPF  is the market  leader with a market share of
45%, followed by Shell and Esso (around 20-25%) and EG3 (10%).
The two restructuring  alternatives the Argentine  government had when privatizing
YPF,  sell  a refinery  to an  "unbranded"  independent  firm  or sell  it to a well-known  oil
firm not present in the Argentine  gasoline market, would have had a very different impact
on  the  vertical  organization  of  the  industry,  but  not  necessarily  in  the  intensity  of
competition.  Selling a refinery  to an unbranded  refinery  implies a move towards  a less
vertically integrated  market structure.  The idea behind this option is that the best way to
increase  competition  is  to  introduce,  upstream,  a  non  integrated  firm  allowing  the
emergence  of  a  new  distribution  channel  (a  wholesale  market  selling  to  unbranded
gasoline stations) to effectively compete with the vertically integrated incumbents.  On the
contrary,  selling a refinery to a vertically integrated new entrant'6 relies on the principle
that  there  could  be  intense  competition  only  if  there  are  equally  strong  vertically
integrated firms with similar resources and strengths.
A  priori,  neither  of the  two  alternatives  delivers  a  more  competitive  market
outcome.  In  any  case,  none  of  them  was  adopted  when  the  Argentine  government
privatized  YPF.  The consequence  of the privatization  model  was a highly concentrated
market  structure,  with  an  underdeveloped  diesel  wholesale  market  and  an  almost
nonexistent regular and premium wholesale market (Montamat,  1999).
5. Contracts and barriers to entry
Faced  with  the  evidence  provided  in  the  previous  sections,  the  investigation
conducted  by the  SDCyC  focused  on the  retail  segment  of the  gasoline  market.  Given
16  We assume the new entrant not only buys the refinery but also buys or builds a network of gasoline
stations.
15that the upstream  sector  of the market (production  of crude oil)  is competitive  and  that
the government  did  not choose  to promote  a more  competitive  market  structure  in the
refining  and  distribution  stages  when  YPF was  privatized,  the SDCyC  concentrated  its
study on  the contractual  relation  between  oil companies  and retail outlets.  In particular,
the SDCyC investigated  if oil companies were using the exclusive distribution  contracts
subscribed with gasoline stations  as a strategic barrier to deter the entry of a new firm or
the growth of a small incumbent.
There  are  different  contractual  agreements  between  oil companies  and  gasoline
stations. They can be summarized as follows (Shepard,  1993):
COCO (Company  Owned-Company  Operated): the  oil  company  owns  the  gasoline
stations  and  the manager  is employed  by the oil company.  The  oil  company  maintains
ownership of the gasoline until it is sold to the consumer and therefore has the right to set
the retail price.
CODO (Company Owned - Dealer Operated): the  land  and  the  immobile  capital  are
owned  by  the  oil  company.  The  manager  is  self-employed.  The oil  company  sets  the
wholesale price and the manager has the right to set the retail price.
DOCO (Dealer  Owned -Company Operated): the dealer is the owner of the land and the
oil company  rents  the  property.  These  arrangements  are  the  least  frequent  in  gasoline
markets.  Oil  companies  are  willing  to  operate  under  this  arrangement  because  the
location of the gasoline station is important for commercial  reasons.
DODO (Dealer Owned - Dealer  Operated): this contractual  arrangement  varies between
countries.  In  the  United  States,  for instance,  the  oil company has  no  investment  in the
gasoline  station  and  decision  rights  over  service  and  retail  price  are  allocated  to  the
station owner.  The only substantive  constraints on manager behavior  are with respect to
product purity  and  labeling.  In  Argentina,  oil  companies  usually17 provide  investment
capital  (in  the  form  of loans)  to refurbish  the  gasoline  station  and they lend  the pumps
and other equipment for the duration of the contract.  To receive these loans, dealers must
follow strict rules about the appearance of the retail outlets.
17  According to the Secretariat of Energy (Resolution 25/00) oil companies gave loans (data until 2000) to
approximately 25% of the retail stations operating under DODO: YPF (26%), Shell (20%), Esso (41 %) and
EG3 (26%).
16In Argentina, DODO is the predominant  contractual  arrangement,  with more than
85%  of the  branded  gasoline  stations  operating  under  this  arrangement  while close  to
10%  are  COCO outlets.  In the United States  65%  of the gasoline  stations  operate under
COCO  and  CODO  arrangements  (being  CODO  much  more  common  than  COCO).
Almost all the remaining  35%  operate  as DODO.  Europe  has  a different  distribution  of
contractual  arrangements:  35% operate as COCO and just over 50% as DODO'8.
Why the data about contractual  arrangements  vary so much among countries?  The
answer has to be found in a cost-benefit  analysis done by oil firms in each market.  When
oil  companies  face  no  legal  constraints  to  the  choice  of  contractual  arrangement  (for
instance  restrictions  to  vertical  integration  or  limits  to  the  duration  of  contracts),  the
optimal  distribution  of  contractual  arrangements  depends  on  the  ability  of  the  oil
company  to  solve a  principal-agent  problem.  The theory  (Tirole,  1988)  says  that  an oil
company  chooses  contracts  with  strong  incentives  but  less  direct  control  when  retail
outlets  characteristics  make  unobservable  effort  by  downstream  agents  (managers)
important.  Oil companies  should trade off incentive  power  for more direct control  when
observable effort is relatively more important. The empirical implication  of this theory is
that in Argentina it is more difficult for an oil company to control its employees  and so it
is  cheaper  to operate  a network  of retail  outlets  with the  DODO arrangement.  It could
also be the case that in Argentina the relation manager-customer  has more weight when a
consumer decides where to buy gasoline.  In this country, a recurrent problem a consumer
faces  when  buying  gasoline  is  that  gasoline  could  be  adulterated.  Thus,  it  is  very
important for the customer to trust the manager and this is more likely when the manager
is the owner of the retail outlet because  she bears the full cost of losing a customer.
The  data clearly  suggests  that  in  Argentina  the role  played by  the  retail  outlets
operating under the DODO contractual  arrangements is very important in the distribution
network of oil companies.  When an oil company  decides  how to allocate  the contractual
arrangements to maintain  and expand its network, it not only takes into account the most
efficient way to solve the principal-agent problem described  in the previous paragraphs,  it
also  incorporates  in  the  decision-making  process  the  competitive  interaction  in  the
18 Sources:  Secretariat of Energy, Argentina;  Energy Information Administration,  U.S; and RepsolYPF,
Europe.
17market. The location of each selling point and the effective  control of the entire network
are  key  determinants  of  the  profitability  of  the  downstream  department  of  an  oil
company. The  success  of each  location  depends,  in  the short run, on  the proximity  and
quality  of  competing  brands'  retail  outlets,  while  in  the  long  run  it  depends  on  the
construction  of new gasoline  stations  by existing or new  competitors.  If oil companies
rely on the DODO arrangement,  as they do in Argentina, to sell gasoline, they also have
to consider the probability of losing a retail  outlet to  an existing or potential  competitor
once the contract  that ties it to the gasoline  station owner expires. When an oil company
directly  operates  a  gasoline  station  (under  COCO  or  CODO),  it  does  not  have  to  be
concerned  about losing a retail  outlet to the competition.  Therefore,  the importance of a
gasoline  station as a key competitive  variable is significant.
If there are no restrictions to the duration of contracts between  oil companies and
gasoline  stations  and  if it  is  relatively  inexpensive  to  have  an  additional  retail  outlet
operating  under  DODO,  a  retail  outlet  can  be  used  as  a  strategic  barrier  to entry.  A
potential  entrant  to  the  market  needs  a distribution  network  with  a minimum  efficient
scale  large  enough  to  be  able  to compete  with  the  incumbents,  especially  if they  have
high market shares  and their brands  are well recognized.  An entrant to a gasoline  market
has  two  options:  build  a  network  of  gasoline  stations  or  try  to  "steal"  them  from
competitors.  The  latter  option  has  clear advantages  because  the  managers  of  gasoline
stations  already in operation  have  a clientele  and  market-specific  experience in  the area
where the gasoline station is located.
An oil company, internalizing  the competitive threat that  competitors pose to the
control of its network,  may use the duration of contracts  as a strategic competitive  tool to
deter  entry.  In  other  words,  oil companies  may extend the  duration  of contracts  under
DODO far beyond the optimal duration required  to amortize  any loan or any retail outlet-
specific  investment  in  order to deter  entry.  If all  incumbent  oil  companies  pursue  this
strategy  simultaneously  they  could effectively  be coordinating  a strategy  to  deter entry
and send a signal to soften price competition.  A possible criticism to this argument  is that
signing a long term contract  with an oil company is in the interest of the gasoline  station
owner;  if not, the  owner  would  bargain  and  sign  a  contract  with  a  shorter  duration  or
reject  the offer and look for another oil company  willing to sign with the conditions  the
18owner wants.  It is fair to say that  this criticism  ignores the characteristics  of a gasoline
market, especially those prevailing in Argentina.
In general, the operation of a DODO gasoline  station is done by a small firn  and
usually it is an  activity that  supports  and employs  a family. It is seldom the case that a
single firm  or person  owns  many gasoline  stations.  Therefore,  it  is clear that  there  are
significant  asymmetries  in the bargaining  power  of an  oil company  and the owner  of a
gasoline  station.  Thus  the  likely  outcome  of contract  negotiations  is  that  the  owner
accepts the conditions  imposed by  the oil company.  Only  for those  locations  with high
commercial  value  the  oil  company  is  willing  to modify  (and  shorten)  the  duration  of
contracts.  Another factor that  reduces  the bargaining  power of the owner of a gasoline
station  in Argentina  is that  all the  incumbent oil companies  have  a  similar policy with
respect to the duration of contracts.  As a result, it is possible that a disagreement with the
oil  company  gives  a  bad  reputation  to  the  owner  and  consequently  the  other  oil
companies  refuse  to  deal  with  her.  Moreover,  oil  companies  have  the  financial
capabilities  to  threaten the  owner  of a  gasoline  station  to build  another  station  closely
located  and  provide  it  with  better  commercial  conditions,  forcing  the  owner  into
bankruptcy.
Summarizing,  oil  companies  decide  the  optimal  allocation  of  contractual
arrangements  by  solving  a  principal-agent  problem.  The  most  efficient  allocation  of
company-owned  and dealer-owned  gasoline stations  in  a network depends  on the ability
of oil  companies  to provide  incentives  and  control  the  managers  of gasoline  stations.
Besides  the efficiency  considerations,  oil companies  can  use the network  as a strategic
barrier  to  entry,  deterring  potential  competitors  or  hindering  the  growth  of  smaller
competitors.  Thus, oil companies will decide the size and contractual  composition of the
network of retail outlets taking into account an efficiency (cost minimizing) dimension as
well as a strategic competitive dimension.
6. The study of the SDCyC and its policy recommendations
The objectives  of the  study conducted  by  the SDCyC  were  the identification  of
market characteristics  that hinder the development  of a competitive gasoline market  and
suggest policy recommendations.
19As  explained  in the previous  section, the SDCyC considered  that the duration of
contracts  between  oil companies  and gasoline  stations in Argentina could be a barrier to
entry to the downstream stage of the gasoline  market. This section describes the evidence
that the SDCyC used to prove this hypothesis.
The  SDCyC  also  identified  other  factors  that  do  not  support  a  competitive
gasoline  market,  being the lack of a well developed wholesale  gasoline  market the most
important.  However,  the  SDCyC  did not  make  any  explicit policy  recommendation  to
help the development  of a wholesale  gasoline  market.  The reason  for the lack  of policy
recommendations for this stage of the market is that the SDCyC considered  that the best
policy  -force  RepsolYPF  to  sell  one  of  its  biggest  refineries-  was  impossible  to
implement  because  it would  constitute  a  violation  of property rights  that would  require
the Argentine government  to provide RepsolYPF  a significant  amount of compensation
19 funds'
How  has  contract  duration  evolved  since  the  deregulation  of  the  Argentine
gasoline  market?  To answer this question,  the SDCyC  analyzed  a survey  conducted  by
the Secretariat  of Energy20 during  the  first months  of 2000.  This  survey  covered  more
than 25%  of the gasoline  stations  in  the country  and  provided  information  about  many
characteristics  of  the  contracts  signed  between  oil  companies  and  gasoline  stations'
owners.
Figure  6  shows the average  duration  of contracts  that oil companies  signed with
gasoline  stations  after  the  gasoline  market  was  deregulated.  The  contracts  surveyed
correspond  to the DODO arrangement,  that  accounts  for approximately 90% of branded
gasoline stations. The largest firms, YPF, Esso and Shell have contracts with very similar
average duration. Instead, EG3's portfolio of contracts has a shorter duration.
19 As explained in the section  "Privatization model and  its impact on competition",  the Argentine
government had the opportunity to sell one of YPF's biggest refineries during its privatization,  but chose
not to do it and pursue other objectives (for instance,  maximize fiscal resources)
20 Resolution  25/2000.
20Figure 6
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In  order  to  analyze  if  the  average  duration  of  contracts  increased  since
deregulation  until 2000,  the  SDCyC  divided the  sample in  two  sub-periods,  1990-1995
and  1995-20002l.  The  distribution  of contract  duration  in  these periods  can  be seen  in
figure 7.  It is clear that  the distribution of contracts  changed,  being more  skewed  to the
right the  distribution  of contracts  signed  between  1996 and  2000. For  instance,  73%  of
the contracts  signed  between  1990  and  1995  had a duration  of less than  10 years  while
only 55% of the contracts  signed between  1996 and 2000 had the same duration. Besides,
it  is  important  to  highlight  the  increase  in  the  percentage  of contracts  with  a  duration
between  14 and 16 years.
21  The total  sample size is 1566. The sample  for the sub-period  1990-1995 is 492 while the one for the sub-
period 1996 - 2000 is  1074.
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Source: Resolution 25/2000, Secretariat  of Energy,  Argentina
Recognizing that the increment in the duration of contracts between oil companies
and gasoline  stations in Argentina could be following a worldwide  policy adopted by the
multinational  oil  companies  operating  in  this  country  (RepsolYPF,  Exxon,  Shell),  the
SDCyC studied the recent international experience in this area.
The  SDCyC  correctly  focused  the  study  of  the  international  experience  on
Europe. Many  markets  in this continent  share  similar characteristics  with the  Argentine
gasoline  market,  especially  Spain,  where  the  gasoline  market  was  fully  deregulated  in
1998 and RepsolYPF has a significant market share (Contin,  1999).
In  December  of  1999,  the  European  Commission  issued  a  Resolution
(2790/99/CE) that imposed new conditions  for exclusive contracts.  The direct implication
of this  resolution  in  the  gasoline  market  is  that  contracts  between  oil  companies  and
gasoline  stations can not exceed five  years.  It is  implicit in  this Resolution  the idea that
22by limiting  the duration  of contracts the  gasoline market  can  become  more contestable.
The European  Commission considered that five years constituted a long enough period of
time for an oil company to recover any gasoline station-specific investment.
In  1998 the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) conducted a study about the competition
in the supply of petrol  in the  United  Kingdom.  In it,  the OFT made no recommendation
about  the duration  of contracts  between  oil  companies  and  gasoline  stations.  However,
the OFT explained that the average duration  of contracts in the UK does not exceed three
years  and  that the  driving  competitive  force  in  the  market  is  the  entry  and  growth  of
gasoline  stations  in the supermarkets.  This  competitive  force  emerged in  Argentina with
the  French  supermarket  chain  Carrefour  but,  although  it  was  initially  successful22,  its
strength soon diminished.
In line  with  the  international  experience,  the  SDCyC  recommended  to limit the
duration of contracts to a maximum of five years. Nevertheless  it introduced an important
variant  with  respect  to  the  European  Commission's  resolution.  Recognizing  that
Argentina has higher  costs of capital  and that the objective of the recommendations  is to
incentive  the entry of a new competitor or the growth  of a small incumbent,  the SDCyC
explicitly  differentiated  between  new  gasoline  stations  and  those  stations  already  in
operation.  For the  new  stations,  the  recommendations  suggested  a  maximum  contract
duration of eight years, allowing more time to amortize  specific investments.
The  second  recommendation  suggested  the  adoption  of  a  limit  to  vertical
integration.  What would be the expected reaction  of an incumbent oil company to a five
year  limit  on  contract  duration,  provided  that  the  average  duration  of its portfolio  of
contracts exceeds  eleven years?.  Shorter contracts mean that the control of the network of
gasoline stations  operating under an oil company's  brand will be more difficult.  Gasoline
stations'  owners  can  look for better  contracts  more  often and  potential  entrants  have  a
larger pool of stations to choose from. Thus, the expected reaction of an oil company  that
wants to  keep  an effective  control  of its  network  will  be to vertically  integrate,  buying
gasoline  stations  that operate  under its brand.  In  other words,  it will attempt  to convert
some  of the  DODO  gasoline  stations  to  COCO.  Anticipating  this  effect,  the  SDCyC
22 The entry of Carrefour,  using the EG3 brand,  triggered  local price wars between  the major incumbents.
After some time of low prices, Carrefour increased prices and  they remain slightly lower than the prices
charged by the major incumbents.
23recommended  a  forty  percent  limit  to  the  quantity  of  company  owned  (COCO  and
CODO) gasoline stations that can operate under each brand.
7. Advocacy  and competition in the Argentine gasoline market: policy  evaluation.
In  2000  the  SDCyC's policy  recommendations  were  legally  implemented  by  a
Presidential  Decree23. After  almost  three  years,  an  empirical  evaluation  is  difficult  to
make due  to the deep economic  recession that has affected the Argentine  economy since
1998. Nevertheless  we can evaluate the positive and negative aspects of the design of the
policy recommendations  and the impact they are likely to have on the Argentine gasoline
market (Table 2).
By all means, the limit imposed on the  duration of contracts is a pro-competitive
policy.  It  increments  the liquidity  of the  gasoline  stations  contract  market,  making  the
gasoline  market  more  contestable.  Before  the  adoption  of this  policy,  and  given  the
extension  in the average  duration  of contracts  signed by the incumbent oil companies,  a
potential  entrant  had  to build new  gasoline  stations to set  up  a competitive  distribution
network.  Thanks  to  the  limit imposed  on  the  duration  of contracts  and the  consequent
higher  availability  of contracts  every  year,  an  entrant  has  more  options  to  set  up  its
network because it can "steal"  gasoline stations from the incumbents.
Paradoxically,  one  of the  most  important  positive  characteristics  of  the  policy
recommendations  turns  out  to  be  one  of  their  main  drawbacks  as  well.  The  SDCyC
emphasized  the need  to respect property rights  and that is why the five  year limit on the
duration  of contracts  applies  only  to  the  expiring  contracts  and  not  to  those  in  force.
Argentina  is  a  country  that  had  many  events  of flagrant  violation  of property  rights.
Therefore,  the  efforts  done  by  the  SDCyC  to  design  policies  to  increase  competition
keeping as a main premise the need to respect property rights is, by itself, a characteristic
that should be  recognized.  However,  the implication  of applying the limit exclusively  to
the expiring contracts makes the positive effects very difficult to observe in the short run.
Given the actual duration of contracts  (that on average exceeds  eleven years), it will take
some  years  for the  whole stock  of contracts  to  expire  once  every  five  years.  In  other
23 Presidential Decree  1060/00.
24words,  the liquidity of the gasoline  station contracts is not expected to increase for some
years, possible delaying the decision to enter of a potential entrant.
Table 2: Evaluation of policy  recommendations
POSITIVE  NEGATIVE
Pro-competitive:  limit  on  the  duration  of  Unlikely short term impact on competition and
contracts reduces a barrier to entry  prices: until  all  contracts  start  to expire  every
five  years  the  access  to  the  incumbent  oil
companies'  distribution  networks  will  be
difficult.  Can  have  a  positive  impact  on
competition only in the long run  .
Forward looking  and  respect  of  property  One  sided policy:  the  new  policies  will  be
rights: the  limit  on  the  duration  of contracts  effective  only if the Argentine  gasoline  market
applies  to  the  expiring  contracts  and  not  to  grows.  The probability of entry  or growth  of a
those in effect.  small  incumbent,  is much higher  if the market
grows
In  line  with  the  international experience:
followed  an  European  Commission's  ruling
(2790/99)  which  imposed  the  same  limit  (5
years) to the duration of contracts.  _
No  prohibition of vertical integration: a  non
binding  ceiling  to  vertical  integration  will
allow  the  incumbent  oil  companies  to
counterweight  any  cartelization  attempt  of  a
group of gasoline stations.
At first glance, the five year limit imposed on contracts  may seem arbitrary.  Why
five years and not three or ten? Although these type of regulations have certain degree of
arbitrariness,  the  SDCyC was wise enough to follow  the precedent  set by the European
Commission in  1999.  Equally important,  the SDCyC  allowed  a longer contract  duration
for  new  gasoline  stations  (eight  years)  because  it  recognized  that  oil  companies  in
Argentina usually provide credits to gasoline stations and that in this country the cost of
capital is higher than in Europe.
The decision to impose a ceiling to vertical integration is controversial.  The recent
empirical literature  that tried to measure  the effects of vertical  integration  on final prices
is contradictory.  Vita (2000) analyzed the impact of divorcement  ruleS24  in force in some
states  of  the  United  States  and  concluded  that  these  rules  increase  the  final  price  of
24 Gasoline "divorcement"  statues restrict -and in their most strict form, proscribe-  the vertical integration
of gasoline refiners and gasoline retailers.
25gasoline,  on  average,  2.6  cents  per  gallon.  However,  a recent  paper  (Aydemir  2002)
presents different  results. When  estimating the competitive effects of vertical integration
of gasoline  refineries and retailers  in the U.S., Aydemir found that the foreclosure  effect
dominates the efficiency  benefits,  increasing  wholesale  prices of refined gasoline  by 0.2
to 0.6  cents  per gallon.  Hastings  (2002)  examines  the  effects  of changes  in  different
vertical  contract types  on local retail  prices.  Using detailed  station-level  data in the Los
Angeles and San Diego Metropolitan areas she found that a change in the market share of
oil  company-owned  and  dealer-owned  gasoline  stations  does  not  have  a  significant
impact  on local  market  price.  She  suggests  that  this result  argues  against  divorcement
rules in gasoline markets.
Why  did  the  SDCyC  suggest  a 40%  limit to  the  quantity  of company-owned
gasoline  stations that can operate under a brand, knowing that only  10%  of the gasoline
stations  were  company-owned  in  2000?  There  are  two  possible  explanations  for  this
number.  The  first is  that the  SDCyC looked  at  the European  statistics  which  show that
35%  of the  gasoline  stations  operate  in  a COCO  arrangement.  Given  that the  SDCyC
recommended  the  same limit to the duration  of contracts,  it may have assumed  that oil
companies  would follow  the same strategy  as in Europe, especially  RepsolYPF,  and  so
recommended  a limit to vertical  integration  that resembles  the European  data for  1999.
The second explanation  relies on a political economy  argument.  The SDCyC faced two
groups  with  conflicting  interests25. On  one  side,  the  oil  companies  that  pressured  to
maintain  with  the  status  quo.  On  the  other  side,  the  associations  of gasoline  stations
owners had been lobbying the Argentine Congress to approve  a divorcement  law for the
gasoline  market.  It seems that the SDCyC wanted to accommodate  the demands of these
two  groups  and  reduce  the  resistance  to  the  implementation  of  its  policy
recommendations.  To  reach  this  objective,  the  SDCyC  won  the  partial  support  of the
association  of gasoline  station owners by limiting the duration  of contracts  and reduced
the  resistance  of  the  oil  companies  by  letting  them  embark  in  a  process  of  vertical
integration  that  would  allow  them  to  assure  the  control  of a  significant  share  of their
distribution network.
25 The recommendations  faced some hard criticisms.  The Senate, controlled by the opposition (peronist)
party repealed  the Presidential  Decree  1060 but it is still in effect because the House of Representatives
tacitly approved  it.
26Abstracting  from  the  possible justifications  the SDCyC  had  when  it  set  a 40%
limit  to  vertical  integration,  it  is  important  to  note  that  certain  degree  of  vertical
integration is desirable.  If vertical  integration  is prohibited  (divorcement  rule) it is likely
that groups of gasoline  stations operate under implicit  agreements  because there will  not
be  any  market  force  that  could  counterweight  their  market  power.  If  incumbent  oil
companies lose all capacity to influence  retail prices,  gasoline  stations have incentives to
increase margins, negatively affecting consumers'  welfare.
All  in  all,  the  new  rules proposed  by the  SDCyC  have  not been  effective.  This
result is the logical consequence  of the design of these rules, because they can only have
an impact on competition if there is new entry or small incumbents decide to expand their
networks.  If the market does not grow, the presence  of a new entrant or the expansion of
a  small  incumbent  are  unlikely.  The  huge  drop  in  gasoline  demand  caused  by  the
economic  crisis  in  Argentina  will  make  the  potential  benefits  of  the  new  rules  very
difficult to observe.
8. Conclusion
The  policies  the  Argentine  Secretariat  of  Consumer  Affairs  and  Defense  of
Competition advocated  -implemented by a Presidential  Decree in 2000- for the gasoline
market were pro-competitive.  The objective of these policies  was to make the Argentine
gasoline -market more contestable  by eliminating the role that long contracts  between oil
companies and gasoline stations play as a strategic barrier to entry.
An evaluation  of the  impact  these  policies  have  had  is  not  an easy  task.  First,
since  the  increase  in  liquidity in  the  gasoline  stations contract  market  will not increase
until  most of the contracts  expire,  barriers  to entry will remain  high,  possibly  delaying
entry decisions.  Second, gasoline demand  fell significantly  since the Argentine economy
entered a recession in  1998, which was aggravated by a major devaluation in 2002. These
policies were designed to foster entry or growth of small incumbents,  an unlikely event if
the market does not grow. Third, multinational  oil companies  do not take entry decisions
based  exclusively  on changes in entry conditions  in one stage of the market;  in general,
they  are  integrated  companies  that  look  at  a  variety  of related  markets.  For instance,
Petrobras  decided  to enter the  Argentine  gasoline  market  in 2000 through  mergers  and
27acquisitions.  The  new  rules  may  have  helped  its  decision  but  it  is  unlikely  that  they
played a significant  role given the importance of the related markets  (extraction of crude
oil and natural gas) relative to the size of the gasoline distribution business in Argentina.
Despite the lack of positive short run outcomes,  the policies recommended  by the
SDCyC opened  the  possibility  to intensify price  competition  in the  Argentine  gasoline
market.  One of the main merits of the recommendations  is the respect of property rights.
They have been  an example  of the  advocacy role a competition  institution  can play,  not
only in a deregulated energy market but in other markets as well.
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